Monetary Trends in the United States and United Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867-1975 by Milton Friedman & Anna J. Schwartz
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Monetary Trends in the United States and United Kingdom:
Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867-1975
Volume Author/Editor: Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz




Chapter Title: Velocity and the Interrelations between the United
States and the United Kingdom
Chapter Author: Milton Friedman, Anna J. Schwartz
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11407
Chapter pages in book: (p. 305 - 341)7 Velocity and the Interrelations
between the United States
and the United Kingdom
The preceding chapter demonstrates that a single demand curve for
money can be used for the United States and the United Kingdom,
provided only that adjustment is made for a difference in the currencies
used in the two countries and in the income elasticity. The largely
common demand curve by itself does not, however, explain the striking
finding in chapter 5 that velocity in the United States and velocity in the
United Kingdom show parallel movements for most of the century our
data cover, and that the rates of change of velocity are nearly identical in
the two countries. If the variables affecting the demand for money and
velocity had behaved very differently in the two countries, the same
demand curve would have generated different realized time series of
velocity. The similar behavior of velocity therefore requires in addition to
a largely common demand curve the similar behavior of the variables
affecting the demand for money. One possible explanation for the similar
behavior of such variables is that the two countries were part of a single
economic entity. National boundaries may have great political import-
ance and economic significance in other respects, yet be consistent with a
financial system that is unified over a much larger area. The international
financial community presumably included (and includes) not only the
United States and the United Kingdom but other countries as well.
However, we perforce limit ourselves to the connections between the
United States and the United Kingdom that are reflected in the similar
behavior of velocity in these two countries. It would be highly desirable to
extend the analysis to other countries as well, but we leave that to other
scholars.
There is nothing novel or surprising about the existence of a unified
financial community. What is novel and surprising is that the links should
have been so close as to produce the degree of parallelism in velocity that
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is recorded in chart 5.5—given the extent to which the two countries
failed to conform to the "law of one price," especially after 1931 (see
chart 6.5, which plots the ratio of the purchasing-power-parity exchange
rate to the market exchange rate).
From 1879 to 1914 and again from 1925 to 1931, the United States and
the United Kingdom were both on a gold standard, and neither imposed
appreciable controls on the movement of capital or engaged in exchange
controls of the modern type (such exchange controls were invented only
in 1934 by Hjalmar Schacht in Germany as part of the Nazi economic
policy).
Before World War I, the United Kingdom had no tariffs. The United
States did, but the tariffs were changed at infrequent intervals and were
not used as an instrument of monetary or exchange policies. The United
States and the United Kingdom almost literally had a single monetary
system—a gold standard or, almost as descriptively, a sterling standard.
As we demonstrated in A Monetary History (and as chart 6.5 confirms),
there was a good deal of leeway for domestic monetary policy over short
periods, but over periods of more than a few years, the quantity of money
in each country was determined by the requirement that the price levels
of the two countries move roughly in step in order to preserve equilibrium
in the balance of payments. Similarly, the capital markets of the two
countries were linked. There was little scope for interest arbitrage, since
the exchange rates had to stay within the narrow gold points, so market
interest rates could not differ much between the two countries. Hence
rates of change in both prices and nominal interest rates were linked in
the two countries.
1
During World Wars I and II, the two countries were linked more
fundamentally, the United States being either a major supplier of goods
to the United Kingdom for wartime use or a partner of the United
Kingdom. From 1925 to 1931, the gold standard was less rigid than in the
pre-World War I period but even so, fixed exchange rates were main-
tained without effective capital or exchange controls,
2 so the links were
still close. During the rest of the interwar period exchange rates were not
rigidly fixed, yet the United States imposed neither exchange controls nor
capital controls, and the United Kingdom imposed them only to a very
minor extent. Interest arbitrage had more scope, but not much more,
1. A view that presents some empirical evidence for the United States and the United
Kingdom for part of the period we cover is contained in Donald N. McCloskey and J.
Richard Zecher, "How the Gold Standard Worked, 1880-1913," in The Monetary
Approach to the Balance of Payments, ed. J. A. Frenkel and H. G. Johnson (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1976), pp. 357-85.
2. See D. E. Moggridge, "British Controls on Long-Term Capital Movements, 1924-
1931," in Essays on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840, ed. D. N. McCloskey (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 113-38.307 The Reference Chronology
since exchange rate fluctuations were fairly small most of the time. Yet
the years 1918 to 1925 and 1931 to 1939 were marked by a looser financial
relation between the United States and the United Kingdom than the
years 1879 to 1914 and 1925 to 1931.
The post-World War II period is more difficult to interpret. Until 1972,
the sterling-dollar exchange rate was temporarily fixed but subject to
change from time to time by official action. Sterling was devalued in 1949,
again in 1967, and was permitted to float in 1972. Until October 1979,
there was extensive exchange control in the United Kingdom, more
sweeping in the early postwar period than later on, but significant
throughout. Moreover, in the 1960s and until the early 1970s, the United
States introduced restrictions on the movements of capital and ex-
change—the interest equalization tax, the tying of foreign aid and other
foreign capital transfers, restrictions on bank loans and foreign invest-
ment by United States enterprises. Hence these postwar years are char-
acterized by the loosest monetary linkage between the United States and
the United Kingdom. They also display the most disparate movements of
velocity (see chart 5.5) and of the ratio of the purchasing-power-parity
exchange rate to the market exchange rate (chart 6.5).
7.1 The Reference Chronology
To judge from chronologies that we have used to define our basic phase
observations, the financial linkages between the two countries were
accompanied by—indeed, presumably were the source of—parallel
movements in general economic activity.
As table 7.1 shows,
3 of thirty-nine United Kingdom turning points in
the 109 years from 1867 to 1975, twenty come in the same year as a United
States turning point of the same kind (i.e., a trough in the same year as a
trough; a peak in the same year as a peak); eleven come one year later;
four come one year earlier; and only four have no corresponding turning
point within one year.
4 Of these four, three are in the post-World War II
period, one in 1926. The 1926 trough, the only miss for the period of a
gold standard, marked the end of the British general strike, which un-
doubtedly distorted cyclical behavior.
For the United States, recorded turning points total fifty-three rather
than thirty-nine, so that fourteen additional turns do not match United
Kingdom turns, making eighteen nonmatching turns in all for the United
States. Twelve come before World War I, one in 1924, and the remaining
3. For comparison of datings, we have used the whole period after 1866 for which we
have both chronologies and United States money data and not simply the period after 1870,
when the United Kingdom money data begin.
4. A precise test of significance is not easy to make because of the condition that troughs
and peaks alternate. But approximate tests of significance for troughs and peaks separately308 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
five after World War II. The twelve before World War I all reflect extra
movements (6 extra cycles) recognized in the United States chronology
but not in the United Kingdom chronology, and so do two (one extra
cycle) of the other six nonmatching turning points.
The extra United States turning points have generally been regarded as
evidence of more marked cyclical movements in the United States than in
the United Kingdom, leading to both briefer and larger cycles in the
United States than in the United Kingdom. Our examination of the data
leads us to enter a caveat. The extra United States turning points may
simply reflect a greater plenitude of statistics for the United States than
for the United Kingdom and a more searching examination of the United
States data for cyclical movements.
5
indicate that the agreement between the two chronologies is greater than could readily be
expected from chance. Consider a contingency table for troughs (table 7.N.1).
Table 7.N.1 Comparison of Trough Reference Dates for the United States
and the United Kingdom
























Contain United States troughs
Precede United States troughs
Follow United States troughs
Are none of above
Total
aNot 27, because the year following the 1975 trough is not included.
Chi-square for this table is 10.7, which is at the .02 level of significance for 3 degrees of
freedom. The corresponding table, with years classified by United Kingdom troughs, yields
a chi-square of 10.4. For peaks, the two corresponding tables yield chi-squares of 14.6 and
10.2. Adding the chi-squares for the corresponding trough and peak tables gives 25.3 and
20.6, which, for 6 degrees of freedom, would be exceeded by chance less than one time in a
thousand.
5. The reference chronologies we use are based on the work done at the NBER,
particularly by Arthur F. Burns and Wesley C. Mitchell. They did a far more exhaustive
study of United States data than of United Kingdom data and had more United States data
to study. In the course of our own reexamination of parts of the chronology that seemed
questionable for one reason or another, we found that we were almost always inclined to
recognize more turning points the broader the range of data we could examine. The
concentration of extra turning points in the pre-1914 period strengthens the suspicion that
we may be dealing with a statistical artifact: in the forty-eight years from 1866 to 1914, there
are twenty-five United States turning points, 13 United Kingdom turning points; in the
remaining sixty-one years, there are twenty-eight United States turning points, twenty-six
United Kingdom turning points. There is a far greater difference between the statistical data
available for the United States and the United Kingdom, and also between the effort that
has been devoted to their analysis, for the pre-1914 than for the post-1914 period.
The major hesitation we have in accepting this interpretation is that the role of the British
economy in the world was changed so drastically by World War I that the United Kingdom309 The Reference Chronology









Corresponding turning points (within one year
of each other)
United Kingdom one year earlier than United States
United Kingdom same year as United States
United Kingdom one year later than United States




Total number of turning points
1 + 2a United Kingdom
1 + 2b United States
United States Cyclical




























One fascinating detail in table 7.1 is the tendency for nonsynchronous
turning points in the United Kingdom to follow those for the United
States. Of the fifteen matching turning points that do not come in the
same year in the United Kingdom and the United States, eleven come
one year later in the United Kingdom and only four come one year
earlier. Of the twenty that come in the same year, monthly reference
dates indicate that twelve came later for the United Kingdom than for the
United States, and six earlier (for two—1944 and 1946—we have no
monthly United Kingdom chronology). One possible explanation is that
cyclical fluctuations mostly originated in the United States and spread
from the United States to the United Kingdom, rather than the other
way—which would also be consistent with the greater amplitude and
frequency of cyclical fluctuations in the United States. It is also the
conclusion that we documented in A Monetary History for the worldwide
contraction that began in 1929.
6
cyclical pattern may also have changed. Britain's financial preeminence in the world before
World War I may have enabled it to ride out fluctuations in the world that would have left
echoes at home after World War I.
R. C. O. Matthews accepts fewer post-World War I turning points than we do, but even
he reports phases of shorter average duration after 1914 than earlier, except for interwar
upswings—resulting from his treatment of 1921-29 as one long expansion ("Postwar Busi-
ness Cycles in the United Kingdom," in Is the Business Cycle Obsolete? ed. M. Bronfen-
brenner (New York: Wiley, 1969), pp. 102-3).
6. Oskar Morgenstern reached the same conclusion for the pre-World War I period for
three European countries (Great Britain, France, Germany): "In general in the prewar
period the United States cycle led those of the three European countries at both peaks and
troughs. . . . After the war the pattern was less definite although the United States cycles
continued to lead British and French cycles at peaks" (International Financial Transactions
and Business Cycles, Studies in Business Cycles, no. 8 [Princeton: Princeton University
Press for NBER, 1959], p. 51).310 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
This apparent lead of cyclical movements in the United States is not
reflected in a simple correlation of annual velocity estimates for the
United States and the United Kingdom. For the 105 years 1871 through
1975, the synchronous correlation coefficient is .492 and is slightly higher
than the correlation for United States velocity leading (.486) or lagging
United Kingdom velocity by one year (.46). Similarly, the synchronous
correlation for year-to-year rates of change in velocity is .42, which is
higher than the correlation for the rate of change in United States velocity
leading (.19) or lagging (.29) the change in United Kingdom velocity by
one year.
The close relation between the two chronologies suggests the desirabil-
ity of using a single chronology for the two countries in order to provide
matching observations that would permit a more detailed statistical inves-
tigation of the relations between them. The best way to get a single
chronology would be literally to treat the United Kingdom and the
United States as a single economic entity and construct a reference
chronology for the combined entity comparable to the chronologies
constructed for each country separately. However, that would be ex-
tremely laborious. Instead, we have substituted computer time for histor-
ical research. We have recalculated the United Kingdom phase bases on
the United States chronology and the United States phase bases on the
United Kingdom chronology. We then started out making two parallel
analyses, one using the United States chronology for both countries, the
other using the United Kingdom chronology for both countries. How-
ever, the results of the two parallel analyses were so close that we have
simplified the exposition and analysis by generally using only the United
States chronology.
One exception is in chart 7.1 which duplicates chart 5.5 except that
velocity and its rate of change are calculated for the same chronological
time units for the United States and the United Kingdom—in chart 7.1,
panel A, the United States chronology, in chart 7.1, panel B, for the
United Kingdom chronology.
Using the same chronology for both countries does not alter in any
important way the story told by the earlier charts.
7.2 Correlation of United States and United Kingdom Velocities
and Their Determinants
The visual impression given by chart 7.1, panels A and B, is confirmed
by the numerical correlation coefficients in table 7.2 covering more than a
century: .49 for velocity and .76 for its rate of change.
Of greater interest are the correlations for the variables we singled out
in chapter 6 as most closely related to the demand for money and hence
velocity: real per capita income; the differential interest rate on alterna-311 Correlation of Velocities and Their Determinants
tives to money (the short rate times the ratio of high-powered money to
money); the rate of change of nominal income (as a proxy for the nominal
yield on physical assets); and the demand shift and postwar shift
dummies.
7 Both the levels and the rates of change of these variables are
highly correlated between the two countries, except only for the rate of
change of real per capita income. Much of the common movement of
velocity can therefore be attributed, as suggested above, to common
movements of the determinants of velocity.
From this point of view, the exception is as significant as the high
correlations. The low correlation between the rates of change of real per
capita income means that the factors affecting the movements in real
income over periods longer than a cycle but shorter than a sizable fraction
of a century are largely independent in the two countries—apparently the
high correlation for levels is primarily between trends. This result is
entirely consistent with our interpretation of the common movements in
velocity as reflecting a unified financial system. A unified financial system
leaves much room for different physical development—as witness the
differences among regions within the United States and the United
Kingdom.
The contrast between financial unification and physical independence
is brought out sharply by the correlations we have added at the bottom of
table 7.2 for prices, nominal income, and money. The correlation for the
level of prices is as high as for any other level variable; for the rate of
change of prices it is decidedly higher than for any other rate-of-change
variable. The correlation for the level of nominal income matches that for
prices, but for the rate of change of nominal income is decidedly lower
than for the rate of change of prices, reflecting the low correlation of the
rate of change of per capita real income.
Although the quantity of money is as highly correlated between the
countries as income and prices—reflecting the dominance of the trend—
the rate of change of money displays the same correlation as the rate of
change of income, and both are decidedly lower than the correlation for
the rate of change of prices. At first glance this result may seem inconsis-
tent with our interpretation of the United States and the United Kingdom
as part of a larger monetary system, but it is not. The key linkage between
the two countries is that prices, expressed in a common currency (i.e.,
adjusted for changes in exchange rates) must move in a way that will keep
international payments in adjustment, which, broadly speaking, means
that prices must move in harmony. If they do not, they will lead to exports
or imports or capital movements that will produce balance-of-payments
7. For the United States, changing financial sophistication should also be listed. Allow-
ance has implicitly been made for that variable by adjusting the quantity of money in the
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Chart 7.1 Levels and rates of change of United States and United King-
dom velocity on United States and United Kingdom dates.314 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
Table 7.2 Correlations of United States and United Kingdom Velocities and
Their Determinants, and Also Prices, Nominal Income, and Money:
Levels and Rates of Change, United States Dates
Correlation
Variable Coefficient
1. Velocity (log V) .49
2. Real per capita income (log y) .96
3. Differential yield on money (RN) .22
4. Rate of change of nominal income (gy)
a .71
5. Demand shift dummy .84
6. Postwar shift dummy .66
7. Rate of change of velocity (gv) .76
8. Rate of change of real per capita income (gy) .17
9. Rate of change of differential yield on money [D(RN)] .65
10. Rate of change of rate of change of nominal income (DgY) .66
11. Rate of change of demand shift dummy .48
12. Rate of change of postwar shift dummy .50
13. Prices (log P) .99
14. Rate of change of prices (gP) .90
15. Nominal income (log Y) .99
16. Rate of change of nominal income (gy)" -73
17. Quantity of money (log M) .99
18. Rate of change of money (gM) .73
aLevel weights used to calculate line 4; rate of change weights used to calculate line 16.
deficits or surpluses, setting in motion the specie-flow mechanism. The
requirement for money and nominal income (or exchange rates) is that
they adjust in such a way as to keep prices in the appropriate relation. But
this requirement is likely to imply a lower correlation for money and
income than for prices, since, to keep prices in harmony, the quantity of
money will have to adapt to differential changes in the demand for money
(in the sense, of course, of "demand schedule" or "function"), and
income will have to adapt to differential changes in output. Put differ-
ently, divergent movements in money and income will occur precisely in
order to keep prices in line. Hence, the lower correlations for money and
income than for prices are entirely consistent with, and indeed strengthen
the evidence for, the two economies being part of a larger monetary
system in which monetary adjustments serve as the key mechanism
keeping the separate parts aligned with one another.
The linkage between prices in the two countries is reflected in chart
6.5.For the whole period before the Great Depression, the ratio of
purchasing power parity to the exchange rate fluctuates within a rather315 Role of Common Determinants of Velocity
narrow range—between a low of 1.00 (in 1896) and a high of 1.23 (in
1910)—and displays no clear trend. The loosening of the financial links
between the two countries as a result of the depression, the 1931 depar-
ture of sterling from the gold standard, the wartime introduction and
postwar continuation of exchange controls, and postwar devaluations,
produced a major increase in the variability of the purchasing power
ratio: from a low of .93 (in 1938) to a high of 1.62 (in 1950). The
post-World War II period saw also the widest divergences in the move-
ment of velocity in the two countries.
7.3 Role of Common Determinants of Velocity
Table 7.3 gives estimates of the role of various factors in accounting for
the common and idiosyncratic movements of velocity in the two
countries.
8 Consider first the columns for the level of velocity. If velocities
8. Five sources of variation in the velocity of each country can be distinguished:
1. The common movement in the two countries of the specified determinants
2. The common movement in the two countries of other common determinants
3. Differential movements in the specified determinants
4a. Differential movements in other common determinants
4b. All other determinants of measured velocity, including those specific to each country,
chance, and measurement error.
We shall not be able to estimate the effects of 4a and 4b separately; so hereafter we refer to
the two together as 4.
If items 1 and 2 were nonexistent, and yet velocity had varied in each country as it in fact
did, the variance of the differences in the logarithms of velocities (log Vuk - log V^) would
be equal to the sum of the variances, or
A. afog Vuk _ tog Vus (hypothetical) = ofog Vuk + afog v^. The actual differences in velocity eliminate the effect of items 1 and 2. Hence
B- °?og vuk - log v^ (measured) is an estimate of the combined effects of items 3 and 4.
Regressing the differences in velocity on the differences in the specified determinants
eliminates the effect of item 3 as well as items 1 and 2. Hence
C. (SEE)fOg Vuk _ log Vus,
 o
r the squared standard error of the residuals from such an
equation, is an estimate of the effect of item 4.
Regressing velocity in each country on the specified determinants for that country
eliminates the effects of items 1 and 3 for that country. Hence
D. (SEE)^, + (SEE)^, or the sum of the squared standard errors of the residuals from
such regressions, is an estimate of the combined effects of items 2 and 4.
It follows that the entry in column 1 of table 7.3 in
Line 5 is A
Line 4 is C
Line 3 is B minus C
Line 2 is D minus C
Line 1 is line 5 minus the entries in lines 2, 3, and 4.
The same analysis applies for the rate of change of velocity by simply replacing velocity by
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in the two countries had been completely independent (i.e., the correla-
tion between them had been zero) but velocity in each country had varied
as much as it actually did, the variance of the difference between the
logarithms of the two velocities (ofog vuk-\og v^) would have been the sum
of the variances in each country separately or the .0600 in line 5 of column
1 of the table. The common movement of the determinants we have
explicitly specified would have accounted for almost half of that hypo-
thetical variance; together with other unspecified but common determi-
nants, it would have accounted for slightly more than half. Differential
movements in the specified determinants accounted for almost 40 per-
cent, leaving 10 percent to be accounted for by all other factors—chance,
measurement error, differential movements in unspecified but common
determinants, and determinants of velocity specific to each country.
In terms of standard deviations, the standard deviation of that part of
the difference between the two velocities that arises from all other factors
is 7.7 percent; from these other factors plus the differential movement of
the specified determinants, 17.2 percent. Common movements in unspe-
cified determinants are of minor importance; including them raises the
standard deviation only to 17.8 percent. Finally, the hypothetical stan-
dard deviation if the velocity series had been unrelated in the two coun-
tries would have been 24.5 percent.
The results are even more striking for rates of change. Common
movements in determinants—those specified and others—account for
over three-quarters of total variance. If there were no common determi-
nants, the standard deviation of the difference between the rates of
change of velocity in the two countries would be 3.4 percent. As it is, it is
1.7 percent.
9 For rates of change, the common movements in unspecified
common determinants are more important than for levels: including
them would raise the standard deviation to 2.7 percent.
7.4 Money and Income
Another way to explore the interrelations between the United States
and the United Kingdom is to examine the effect of changes in the
quantity of money in one country on income in the other.
9. We can use the residual difference in velocity between the two countries to get
additional estimates of the effect of the several specified determinants by regressing these
differences on the corresponding differences between the determinants in the two coun-
tries; and similarly for rates of change. We have done this with the phase data for both levels
and rates of change and, for rates of change only, also with annual data. The results simply
reinforce those of the previous chapter, without adding anything to them, so we simply
summarize them in the appendix to this chapter.318 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
A simple example will indicate the relevance of this approach. Suppose
there were accurate estimates of nominal income and of the quantity of
money in the state of Illinois. Suppose we then examined the relation
between changes in income for the state of Illinois and changes in the
quantity of money in Illinois or in the rest of the country. It would come as
no surprise if income changes in Illinois were more closely related to
monetary changes in the rest of the country than to monetary changes in
Illinois itself. The reason is that Illinois is a small part of a broader
economy using the same money. The quantity of money in Illinois is
endogenous—determined by the amount that people in Illinois want to
hold. They can always get the amount they want by bidding it away from
other states. The forces running from income to money will dominate
those running the other way. Moreover, in such a small unit there is much
room for random perturbation in the demand for money.
For the country as a whole, on the other hand, the quantity of money
comes closer to being exogenous. The forces running from money to
income are likely to be more important relative to those running from
income to money than for Illinois alone. And in such a large unit, random
perturbations have more of an opportunity to cancel out.
At first glance, these considerations suggest only that the income-
money relation for the United States as a whole will be closer than for
Illinois alone. However, the free mobility of men, money, capital, and
goods between Illinois and the rest of the country also makes it likely that
Illinois income will be more closely related to the quantity of money in
the United States as a whole than in Illinois alone. Income movements in
Illinois must be highly correlated with income movements elsewhere.
The random perturbations in that relation are likely to be less than the
random perturbations in the Illinois demand for money. The Illinois
relation alone may best be viewed in terms of Illinois income serving as a
proxy for United States income; Illinois money, for United States money.
Substituting actual United States money for its proxy removes one source
of random disturbance.
Note that the question at issue is not simply whether economic de-
velopments in the rest of the country influence Illinois. Of course they
do—very strongly. However, as in the classical specie-flow mechanism,
or the more recently fashionable monetary theory of the balance of
payments, that influence might operate primarily through balance-of-
payments deficits or surpluses between Illinois and the rest of the coun-
try, or through arbitrage operations reflecting the "law of one price."
Either adjustment mechanism forces the quantity of money in Illinois to
change in line with prices and the quantity of money in the rest of the
economy and so would be fully reflected in the Illinois quantity of money.
The question is whether the monetary changes in the rest of the country319 Money and Income
exert an influence on Illinois beyond those influences reflected in the
Illinois quantity of money.
1
0
A similar example, closer to the United States-United Kingdom rela-
tion, is between Canada and the United States. This example is similar to
the Illinois-United States example in the relative size of Canada and the
United States and in the closeness of the economic links between them. It
differs in the existence of two formally independent monies—Canadian
dollars and United States dollars. This formal independence was largely
irrelevant in those years when the two monies were connected by a fixed
exchange rate and there was no extensive governmental exchange con-
trol. It was potentially much more relevant when exchange control was
extensive and when the monies were linked by floating exchange rates.
However, the periods of extensive exchange control were few, the con-
trols were never thoroughly effective, and the floating rate has tended in
practice to be relatively stable.
For this example, a number of empirical studies have indicated that the
expectations expressed above for Illinois are indeed fulfilled for Canada:
changes in nominal income in Canada are more closely related to changes
in the quantity of money in the United States than to changes in the
quantity of money in Canada, and still more closely related to a weighted
average of the two.
1
1
10. Note also that the question is not the one that has so preoccupied the proponents of
the monetary theory of the balance of payments—whether movements in the balance of
payments and in gold reflect (a) changes in the demand for money arising either from
internal causes or from the direct effect on prices and income of the "law of one price" or (b)
differential changes in prices in different countries reflecting perhaps autonomous changes
in domestic quantities of money, which in turn set in motion the classical specie-flow
mechanism.
In our opinion the much-exaggerated contrast between the classical specie-flow mecha-
nism and the monetary theory of the balance of payments concerns the differential speed of
adjustment of variables that all recognize as significant. The basic issue is empirical—the lag
in reaction to different stimuli. However, some proponents of the monetary theory of the
balance of payments mistakenly translate the question about the balance of payments into
one of whether money determines income or, in an open economy with fixed exchange
rates, income determines money.
In practice, both directions of influence are operative all the time. In any event, the lags in
reaction would largely average out in our phase data. Whatever may cause the changes in
the quantity of money within a country, those changes can in turn be expected to have
predictable effects on nominal income, output, prices, and interest rates. We are dealing
with a dynamic feedback system, not a one-way process. Hence, the controversy about the
monetary theory of the balance of payments is largely irrelevant to the kind of relations
between money and other variables that we explore in this book.
11. See Glenn P. Jenkins, "The Role of the United States Monetary Stock in a Model of
the Canadian Economy," unpublished paper, Money and Banking Workshop, University
of Chicago (April 1971); R. Argarwala, J. Drinkwater, S. D. Khosla, and J. McMenomy,320 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
The United Kingdom economy is larger than the Canadian economy,
geographical barriers to the movement of resources between the United
Kingdom and the United States are greater than between Canada and the
United States, and exchange controls have been more extensive and
lasted longer in the United Kingdom. The empirical question is whether
these differences are sufficiently important to seriously blur the effects of
one country on the other beyond those that are incorporated in each
country's money supply via the specie-flow mechanism or the "law of one
price" or, for the period of floating exchange rates, via the adjustment of
exchange rates, which alters relative money supplies expressed in a
common currency.
7.4.1 Combined Money Stock
One simple test is to relate income (or prices) in each country sepa-
rately to the total money stock in the two countries together rather than
to the money stock in the country in question. Table 7.4 gives the results
of such a test for both levels and rates of change of income and prices.
Before we can add the two money stocks, they must first be expressed
in a common currency. We have done this by using the market exchange
rate ruling in each year. This gives two series: one in dollars, one in
pounds, depending on which country's money stock is converted into the
currency of the other. When exchange rates are constant, as from 1879 to
1914, the two level series are of course, in a fixed ratio and the two
rate-of-change series are identical. But, when exchange rates vary, nei-
ther property holds. To allow for the difference, we regressed the United
States variables on the dollar combined money stock series and its rate of
change and regressed the United Kingdom variables on the pound com-
bined money stock series and its rate of change.
Columns 2 and 3 of table 7.4 give the regression coefficients for the two
regressions (described as "simple," though in fact demand shift and
postwar readjustment effects are allowed for); columns 9 and 10, the
standard errors of estimate; and columns 13 and 14, the squared correla-
tion coefficients.
"A Neoclassical Approach to the Determination of Prices and Wages," Economica, n.s., 39
(August 1972): 250-63.
Indirect evidence for closer relations between Canadian income and the United States
quantity of money than between Canadian income and Canadian quantity of money is
provided by a simulation of the effects of monetary restraint in the United States and
Canada on the two countries. The United States restraint had a greater effect on Canada
than Canadian restraint. This result, however, is critically dependent on the particular
multiple-regression models for Canada and the United States employed in the simulation.
See John Helliwell and Tom Maxwell, "Monetary Interdependence of Canada and the
United States under Alternative Exchange Rate Systems," in National Monetary Policies
and the International Financial System, ed. R. Z. Aliber (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1974), pp. 82-108.321 Money and Income
The results are quite different for income and prices, and for prices, for
the United States and the United Kingdom. For income, the combined
money stock uniformly gives higher standard errors and lower correla-
tions than own-country money; for prices, on the other hand, the com-
bined money stock gives lower standard errors and higher correlations
than own-country money for the United States, but higher standard
errors and lower correlations for the United Kingdom. There is clearly
something here requiring further exploration: Why should the United
Kingdom money stock affect United States prices but not the other way
around? And why should there be a greater effect on prices than on
income?
7.4.2 Own-Country Money, Other-Country Money,
and Other-Country Velocity
As a first step, instead of combining the two money stocks, we have
included them as separate variables in multiple regressions. In the United
States regressions, the United Kingdom money stock is converted to
dollars; in the United Kingdom regressions, the United States money
stock is converted to pounds. These results (columns 4 and 5,11, and 15
in table 7.4) largely confirm those from combined money. For three out
of the four income regressions, the standard error of the multiple regres-
sion is larger than for the simple regression with own-country money. The
exception is for the United Kingdom level of income, for which United
States money has a significant positive coefficient. For prices, the two
United States equations again show a significant effect of United King-
dom money on United States prices. The two for Britain give a slightly
mixed picture—the rate-of-change equation again showing no significant
effect and the level equation showing an effect on the borderline of
significance but in a negative direction; that is, a rise in United States
money tends to lower United Kingdom prices for a given stock of United
Kingdom money.
So far we have been considering only the effects operating through
money stock. However, as we have seen earlier, a unified monetary
system may require divergent movements in the stock of money in the
several countries composing the system in order to offset autonomous
changes in the quantity of money demanded. The linkage between prices
and income is more fundamental than that between money stocks and
may operate in other ways than through changes in the quantity of money
of the other country (for example, through the "law of one price"). One
way to allow for these more subtle effects is to include velocity in the
other country as an additional variable.
1
2
12. Statistically, the inclusion of velocity is equivalent to including income in the other
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The multiple regression including the other-country velocity systemati-
cally gives a lower, and mostly substantially lower, standard error than
the simple regression on own-country money, and with one minor excep-
tion (log P^), also than the multiple regression on own- and other-
country money. The inclusion of velocity does not appreciably alter the
calculated coefficient of other-country money, though in several cases,
notably the effect of United States money on United Kingdom income, it
does substantially increase the corresponding t value. Clearly, the inclu-
sion of velocity allows for a largely independent set of effects.
With two exceptions, velocity accounts for a much larger fraction of the
variation not accounted for by own-country plus other-country money
than other-country money does of the variation not accounted for by
own-country money alone.
1
3 With these two exceptions, money in the
(a) log Y^ = a + b log Mm + c log Muk + d log Vuk.
Now
(b) log Vuk = log Yuk - log Muk,
so (a) can be rewritten:
(c) log Y^ = a + b log Mus + (c-d) log Muk + d log Yuk.
The coefficient d and its associated partial correlation coefficient measure the relation
between that part of log Yuk which is not correlated with log Mm and log Muk and that part of
log Yu, which is not correlated with log M^ and log Muk. They thus measure the additional
connection between the two countries over and above the effect operating through the
money supply.




































a100 times (Column 15 minus column 13)/(1 minus column 13).
b100 times (Column 16 minus column 15)/(1 minus column 15).325 Money and Income
other country is clearly a less potent vehicle for the transmission of
influences from one country to another than are the forces that are
reflected in velocity. Indeed, for the most part, other-country money has
no significant effect at all.
The two exceptions are the level of and rate of change of prices in the
United States—the same two that have been idiosyncratic throughout.
They raise the most intriguing question of interpretation.
For a fuller analysis of these results, it is desirable to allow for the
possibility that wartime observations are distorting the results; and to
distinguish between different exchange-rate regimes.
1
4 Under a fixed-
exchange-rate regime, changes in one country affect another through
actual or potential discrepancies between the countries in the prices of
identical goods and in relative prices of traded and nontraded goods,
which in turn alter trade flows and produce specie flows and capital
movements. Under variable exchange rates, exchange rate changes re-
place specie flows wholly or in part, depending on whether the exchange
rate floats freely or is partly controlled by central bank intervention. If
exchange rates float freely, the own-country money stocks are insulated
from one another, and one channel of influence is closed off. There
remain the other two—other-country money converted into own-country
currency, which will reflect changes in exchange rates as well as in the
nominal quantity of money, and velocity. But it would not be surprising if
the closing off of one channel affected the operation of the others.
14. An example of the usefulness of separating out periods with different exchange-rate
regimes is an article by Terry C. Mills and Geoffrey E. Wood, "Money-Income Rela-
tionships and the Exchange-Rate Regime," Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis Review 60
(August 1978): 22-27.
For the rest, their analysis is not directly relevant to the problem of this chapter, since the
money-income relationship they examine is within each country separately whereas our
main concern is with the effect of monetary and other changes in one country on income in
the other country.
They correctly point out, as we have, that in a fixed exchange rate regime the quantity of
money in one country is endogenous and cannot be determined, except for brief periods, by
the monetary authorities. They use this insight to interpret statistical tests of "causality,"
arguing that the endogeneity of money means that "monetary policy cannot affect income,
but rather income fluctuations produce accommodating monetary flows" (p. 24).
This statement, taken literally, is correct but, as written, highly misleading. Monetary
policy cannot affect the quantity of money except temporarily; nonetheless, changes in the
quantity of money, however produced, will affect income. Indeed, it is precisely because
they do that a gold standard or other fixed exchange rate regime is self-adjusting. Similarly,
while "income fluctuations [whether in the country in question or other countries to which it
is linked] produce accommodating monetary flows," it is also true that monetary flows
produce accommodating income fluctuations.
In short, the exchange rate regime does not affect the existence of a "causal" influence
from money to income; it affects the forces determining the quantity of money and thereby
whether the situation is one of a largely unidirectional influence from money to income or of
simultaneous determination and interaction.326 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
The fixed-exchange rate period includes 1879 to 1914 and 1925 to 1931.
However, given the small number of phases in the period from 1925 to
1931, and the even smaller number of triplets of phases from which rates
of change are calculated, there seems little loss, and a considerable gain
in simplicity, in treating the whole period from 1914 on as corresponding
to a variable-exchange-rate regime, and the pre-1914 period to a fixed-
exchange-rate regime. Unfortunately, this confounds the effect of tem-
poral change with the effect of exchange-rate regime, but history makes
that inevitable, and the confounding would not be significantly reduced
by including the six years from 1925 to 1931 with the thirty-six years
before 1914.
Multiple regressions between the level and rate of change of income
and prices, as dependent variables, and own-country money, other-
country money, and velocity, as independent variables, are summarized
in tables 7.5 and 7.6 for the whole period, peacetime phases, pre-1914
phases, post-1914 phases and post-1914 peacetime phases—in table 7.5
for income and in table 7.6 for prices.
Omitting the wartime phases does not have any major effect on the
results. The division between the fixed-exchange-rate and variable-
exchange-rate periods, on the other hand, has a major effect.
For the United States, neither other-country money nor other-country
velocity has any significant influence on income for each period separately
when own-country money is held constant. The only channel of influence
appears to be own-country money.
1
5 The significant effect of other-
country velocity for the period as a whole apparently is produced by the
difference between the periods. That is true also for the level of prices—
indeed for the pre-1914 period not even own-country money is signifi-
cant. However, the situation is very different for the rate of change of
prices: all three variables seem significant or close to significant for both




For the United Kingdom, the results for the gold standard period are
the same as for the United States: only own-country money is significant
15. Note that this result is perfectly consistent, as we shall see, with prices in the United
States being strongly affected by prices in the United Kingdom, provided that either the
United States quantity of money reacts sufficiently rapidly to accommodate the price effect,
or real output, rather than nominal income, absorbs the price effect, that is, moves in the
opposite direction to prices, leaving nominal income unaffected.


















5.0327 Money and Income
for income, none of the variables is significant for levels of prices; all are
significant for rates of change of prices.
However, for the variable-exchange rate period, the results differ
substantially. First, other-country money and other-country velocity
have a significant influence on income for the whole post-1914 period and
peacetime phases alike, with the exception only of rates of change of
other country money.
1
7 Second, other-country money is not significant for
prices, judged by either levels or rates of change; other-country velocity is
significant for levels but not for rates of change for peacetime phases.
1
8
Some of the puzzles raised for the period as a whole stand out in even
sharper form for subperiods. (1) For the gold standard period, why
should other-country money and velocity influence the rate of change of
prices in both the United States and the United Kingdom but not the rate
of change of nominal income? (2) For the variable-exchange-rate period,
why the differences between the United States and the United Kingdom?
(Both the level of and rate of change of nominal income in the United
Kingdom but not in the United States are affected by other-country
money and velocity. The rate of change of prices in the United States but
not in the United Kingdom is affected by other-country money and
velocity.)
Gold-Standard Period: Income versus Prices
The explanation for a significant effect of other-country variables on
rates of change of prices but not of incomes seems straightforward. For
each country separately, a relatively stable demand function for money
with a close to unity real income elasticity means that the nominal
quantity of money (or rate of change) and nominal income (or rate of
change) must be consistent with one another, and each country is large
enough so that its own money stock is a better proxy for the relevant
monetary magnitude than any broader total including other countries—
the interpretation we gave earlier for the corresponding income results
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C332 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
Prices, however, are a different matter. For internationally traded
goods, there is a single world price level and, as we saw in table 7.2, the
correlation between the rate of change of prices in the two countries is
higher than for any other rate-of-change magnitude. For a given rate of
growth of nominal income in the United States, an increased rate of
growth of nominal income in the United Kingdom would tend, at least in
part, to take the form of a higher rate of growth of prices, which in turn
would be reflected in United States prices—and conversely.
On this interpretation, the effect of both other-country money and
other-country velocity is through income; that is, for fixed other-country
money, a rise in other-country velocity means a rise in other-country
income; for fixed other-country velocity, a rise in other-country money
also means a rise in other-country income. But if both other-country
money and other country velocity are affecting prices only via other-
country income, their coefficients should be equal.
1
9 That condition is
close to being satisfied for the rate-of-change equations. The coefficients
are .49 and .42 for the United States and .30 and .18 for the United
Kingdom, and the differences are not statistically significant.
The numerical value of these coefficients suggests roughly twice as
great an effect of an increase in the rate of change of United Kingdom
income on United States prices as the rate of change of United States
income on United Kingdom prices. Three factors presumably combine to
produce this result: first, international trade was more important for the
United Kingdom than for the United States; second, during the gold
standard period, the United Kingdom was the major trading country of
the world. Both factors would make United Kingdom prices more repre-
sentative of international prices than United States prices. Third, as
chapter 9 demonstrates, other things the same, a larger fraction of a
change in nominal income tends to be reflected in prices rather than
output for the United Kingdom than for the United States.
The absolute sizes of the coefficients are not unreasonable on this
interpretation. For the United States, a one percentage point increase in
the rate of change of its own money stock (which implies roughly a one
percentage point increase in the rate of change of its income), tends to
produce a percentage point increase of about 0.6 in the rate of change of
its prices; a one percentage point increase in United Kingdom velocity
(i.e., income) tends to produce a percentage point increase of about
0.4—about two-thirds as much; perhaps somewhat high but not un-
reasonable considering the United Kingdom role in the world at the time.
For the United Kingdom, a one percentage point increase in the rate of
change of its own money stock tends to produce a slightly larger percent-
age point increase in the rate of change of its prices—nearly 0.7 percent-
19. See note 12 above.333 Money and Income
age points, while a one percentage point increase in the rate of change of
United States velocity (i.e., income) tends to produce an increase of only
about 0.2 percentage point.
One final point: why should these effects show up on rates of change
and not on levels? Presumably the answer is statistical: the level figures
are dominated by trends, and so these effects show up only in the more
sensitive rate-of-change figures.
Variable-Exchange-Rate Period
Different effects on nominal income, United States and United King-
dom. As we noted earlier, it would not be surprising if the partial or total
blocking of one channel of influence—via specie flows—enhanced the
importance of other channels of influence. That clearly happened for the
United Kingdom, as judged not only by the significance of other-country
money and velocity, but also by the decided decline in the coefficient of
own-country money—from 0.93 and 1.05 for pre-1914 levels and rates of
change of income to 0.73 and 0.75 for post-1914 phases, and 0.82 and 0.72
for post-1914 peacetime phases.
The puzzle is why the same phenomenon did not occur for the United
States: with one exception, for rates of change for the post-1914 period as
a whole, neither other-country money nor other-country velocity is more
than marginally significant; and, with no exceptions, the coefficients of
own-country money are higher after 1914 than before. The obvious
explanation is the changed role of the United States and the United
Kingdom. Not only did the size of the United States economy continue to
rise relative to that of the United Kingdom economy, but the United
States replaced the United Kingdom after 1914 as the financial center of
the world. If before 1914 the world could have been said to be on a
sterling standard, after 1914 it could be said to be on a dollar standard. In
addition, after World War II, the United Kingdom had extensive foreign
exchange and other controls. Given the continued importance of foreign
trade and foreign capital to the United Kingdom, these controls could not
insulate the United Kingdom from foreign influences, but they could, and
presumably did, limit any reciprocal effect of United Kingdom develop-
ments on the United States.
This explanation is far from satisfactory, because, while the changes
outlined could certainly be expected to produce a greater effect of United
States variables on the United Kingdom than of United Kingdom vari-
ables on the United States, it seems implausible that they would eliminate
any reverse effect, as they apparently did at least during post-1914
peacetime phases. However, we have been unable to find any other
answer to the puzzle.
Another issue raised by our results for the United Kingdom is the
channels through which the changes in the United States affected the334 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
United Kingdom. For the gold standard period and the effect on prices,
we found that our two other-country variables—money and velocity—
could have been replaced by a single variable, other-country income.
This is not true for the post-1914 period for United Kingdom income.
2
0
The coefficient of United States velocity is consistently higher —gener-
ally much higher—than the coefficient of United States money.
2
1 Appar-
ently, changes in United States money and United States velocity that
have the same effect on United States income have a different effect on
United Kingdom income.
One reason this might be true for the post-1914 period is that other-
country money reflects changes in exchange rates, whereas other-country
velocity does not. For the United Kingdom income regression, United
States money in dollars is converted into pounds by multiplying by the
market price of the dollar in terms of pounds. As a result, a rise, for
example, in United States money in terms of pounds for given velocity
may reflect simply a change in the exchange rate without a rise in United
States dollar income. Such a change in the exchange rate would not affect
United States velocity, which is the ratio of the dollar aggregates.
However, United States money is not serving simply as a proxy for the
exchange rate: if the exchange rate is substituted for other-country
money in multiple regressions for United Kingdom income for the post-
1914 period like those in table 7.5, three of the four coefficients are not
statistically significant (/values of 0.8, .05,1.4) though the corresponding
coefficient of other-country money is.
2
2 The exchange rate, if anything,
apparently dilutes the influence of other-country money—a result to be
expected, since one of the effects of a floating exchange rate is to partly
insulate countries from monetary changes in other countries.
20. In equation (c) of note 12, if c = d, as it apparently does for the pre-1914 period, the
penultimate term has a coefficient of zero and drops out, whereas if c =/= d, as is true after
1914, both final terms are relevant.


















22. The fourth coefficient of the exchange rate, for rate of change, post-1914 peacetime,
gives a t value of 2.9 compared with 1.5 for other-country money. This one case is suggestive
but inconclusive.
For corresponding regressions for the United States, the t values for the exchange rate
range from 0.13 to 1.3, simply duplicating the finding for other-country money.335 Money and Income
What about United States velocity? A rise in velocity in the United
States for a given United States (dollar) stock of money
2
3 will produce or
accompany a rise in nominal income and be produced by or accompany
also a rise in interest rates. The rise in nominal income will tend to raise
United States imports, lower United States exports, and thus shift the
current balance toward a deficit. The deficit (or reduced surplus) can be
financed (1) by a money flow (the classical specie-flow movement), which
would affect the own-country money term in our equations; or (2) by an
offsetting capital movement stimulated by the higher interest rates; or it
could be eliminated by a change in exchange rates, which would affect the
other-country money term in our equations. The absence of any signifi-
cant influence of other-country velocity before 1914 presumably reflects
the dominance of item 1 under a gold standard; the significant influence
of United States velocity on United Kingdom income after 1914, reflects
the closing off of item 1, and the effect of item 2. Given a common capital
market, higher interest rates in the United States would mean higher
interest rates in the United Kingdom, which would in turn raise United
Kingdom velocity and nominal income for a given United Kingdom stock
of money.
We can test this explanation by replacing velocity in our multiple
regression by a short-term interest rate. The results are favorable to the
explanation: the coefficients of the United States interest rate in the
United Kingdom income regressions are uniformly positive, the t values
are 1.6, 1.7, 3.1, and 1.9, either approaching or exceeding a significant
level, and in three of the four comparisons are less than the t values for
velocity itself. This final result is favorable because the short-term in-
terest rate is only one of the set of rates that might be expected to be
associated with changed velocity, so velocity itself might be expected to
have a greater influence than any single interest rate. Finally, the implied
effect of the United States interest rate on United Kingdom velocity is
consistent with the findings of chapter 6.
2
4
Presumably the coefficient of the United States money-stock term
reflects a diluted version of the same effect—diluted both because of
exchange rate changes and also because a rise in United States income
accompanied by a rise in United States money with constant velocity
would tend to be associated with less of a rise in interest rates than a rise in
23. Note that other-country money is in pounds in our U.K. regressions.
24. The ratio of the coefficient of the interest rate term to the coefficient of the velocity
term is an estimate of the interest slope (i.e., the derivative of the logarithm of velocity with
respect to the interest rate). This ratio is 3.2 and 4.9 for levels of the post-1914 period as a
whole and the peacetime phases, respectively, and 5.7 and 4.8 for the rates of change. These
are well within the range of the corresponding lower- and upper-limit estimates (with
changed sign) in note 51 of chapter 6.336 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
United States income accompanied by a rise in velocity with constant
United States money.
Different effects on the rate of change of prices, United States and United
Kingdom. United Kingdom variables might be expected to influence
United States prices in the post-1914 period for the same reason as in the
pre-1914 period—because changes in United Kingdom income partly
mirror changes in the world price level.
2
5 As for the pre-1914 period, the
level equations show no effect of other-country variables on prices, the
rate-of-change equations do; and the coefficients of money and velocity
are nearly identical for post-1914 peacetime phases (.41 and .42), though
not for the post-1914 period as a whole, just as they were before 1914.
The one important difference between pre- and post-1914 results is the
decline in the own-country money coefficient from 0.61 to 0.38. Perhaps
this reflects the greater role of the United States in the world economy.
The remaining puzzle is why the United Kingdom does not show the
same effect of other-country variables on the rate of change of prices after
1914 as before. The answer apparently is because a major part of the
difference in United Kingdom price movements is reflected in, or pro-
duced by, changes in the exchange rate, and the relevant equations allow
for this effect only indirectly through the conversion of United States
money into its equivalent in pounds. If the rate of change of the exchange
rate is substituted for the rate of change of other-country money in the
multiple regressions for the rate of price change in the United Kingdom,
it has a significant effect (/values 3.2 and 4.5 for the post-1914 period as a
whole and peacetime phases, respectively). Even more important, for
given rate of exchange rate change, the rate of change of other-country
velocity has a significant effect (lvalues of 5.9 and 5.1), and its coefficient
is much higher than in the prewar period (.61 and .69 compared with . 18).
For given exchange rates, a one percentage point increase in the United
Kingdom rate of change of money tends to raise United Kingdom prices
by roughly 0.8 percentage points; a one percentage point rise in United
States velocity tends to raise United Kingdom prices by 0.6 to 0.7 per-
centage points—indicating the much greater role of the United States




25. Note that the two United Kingdom variables largely eliminate price changes specific
to the United Kingdom, the money variable because it is converted to dollars, the velocity
variable because it is a ratio of two magnitudes in pounds.
26. The equations in question (omitting dummies) are as follows for the post-1914 period
as a whole and peacetime phases, respectively:337 Conclusion
7.5 Conclusion
The common movements of velocity in the United States and the
United Kingdom reflect a unified financial system in which monetary
variables—prices, interest rates, nominal incomes, stocks of money—are
constrained to keep largely in step except as changes in exchange rates
alter the number of units of one country's currency equivalent to one unit
of the other country's currency. Within the unified financial system, there
is much room for divergence of physical magnitudes—movements in real
per capita output are least closely linked between the two countries;
movements in prices, expressed in a common currency, are most closely
linked. Influence ran both ways across the Atlantic, though there is some
evidence that real effects were stronger from west to east and price effects
from east to west. Moreover, the changing role of the United States and
the United Kingdom in the world economy leaves a clear impress on our
data.
During the gold standard period before 1914, the influence of each
country on the other country's nominal income was manifested entirely
through its influence on the other country's money—the classical specie-
flow process. Each country was sufficiently large so that using the money
stock for a larger area does not appreciably improve the correlation with
income. That remains true for the United States after 1914, when vari-
able exchange rates were the rule, but not for the United Kingdom, the
nominal income of which was affected by changes in United States money
and velocity. These changes apparently affected United Kingdom income
by altering interest rates in the United States, which, given a common
capital market, affected United Kingdom interest rates and thereby also
United Kingdom velocity. Apparently, blocking the gold-standard chan-
nel of influence via specie flows diverted the influence of United States
monetary changes into other channels. The difference in results for the
United States and the United Kingdom is something of a puzzle, only
partly explained by the far greater role of the United States in the
post-1914 world than earlier.
gP = - 0.01 + 0.83gM - 0.09gEX + 0.61gv uk (3.1) (14.4)








where gEX is the rate of change of the exchange rate.338 Velocity and Interrelations between United States and United Kingdom
For both the gold standard period and the later variable-exchange rate
period, price changes in each country are affected by monetary changes
in the other, not only through effects on own-country money but also
more directly—though to isolate this effect for the United Kingdom after
1914 requires allowing explicitly for changes in exchange rates. This is the
counterpart of the closer linkage of prices throughout the world than of
physical magnitudes—an expression of the "law of one price."
The one world we have been exploring clearly extends beyond the
geographical boundaries of the United States and the United Kingdom,
and our results show reflections of this wider world especially in the
changing relation between the influences running west to east and east to
west. A fuller analysis of this wider world, though it is beyond our scope,
would much improve our understanding of the bilateral relations to which
we have restricted our own work.
7.6 Appendix: Regressions of Velocity Differences in the United States
and United Kingdom on Differences in Specified Determinants
Table 7.7 presents the coefficients calculated from regressions of veloc-
ity differences in the United States and United Kingdom on differences in
the specified determinants. The first two lines are based on phase data,
the third on annual data. In interpreting the coefficient of the real per
capita income variable, note that unity must be subtracted from the
elasticity of velocity and the sign changed in order to obtain an estimate of
the elasticity of real per capita money. For the other variables, the sign
but not numerical size of the coefficients must be changed to obtain
estimates of the corresponding coefficients for a real per capita money
equation.
Table 7.8 compares the estimates of the effects of specified determi-
nants from our earlier regressions based on data for the separate coun-
tries and the regressions in table 7.7. It is clear that, allowing for sampling
error, the estimates are similar. Note that, as always, the regression effect
makes these estimates lower limits of the indicated effect.
2
7 The upper
limits are straightforward to compute for the variables other than the
income elasticity, and as for the level equations (see table 6.15) are very
much above the lower limits.
27. For the regressions based on velocity differences, note that
log Vuk - log Vm = (log yuk - log ym) - (log muk - log m^).
Since the difference between the logs of real per capita income is included as an independent
variable, the results in table 7.8 are identical with those that would have been observed from
a regression in which the dependent variable was based on the difference between real per





























































































































The final line of table 7.8 requires some explanation. The standard
errors for the velocity equations in the penultimate line are for a differ-
ence between the two countries. If the errors of estimate are independent
for the two countries but have the same variance for each—as we found in
chapter 6, they do for the United States and the United Kingdom—then
the standard error of the difference is 1//2 times the standard error for a
single country. The entries for the velocity equations in the final line are
therefore 1//2 times the entry in the penultimate line.
The differential velocity equations implicitly allow not only for the
specified determinants allowed for by the money equation, but also for
other unspecified determinants of velocity that tend to have common
movements in the two countries. That might be expected to produce a
smaller standard error. It does for the rate of change equations but not for
the level equations—presumably because, as table 7.3 indicates, these
common movements in unspecified determinants are far more important
for short-term fluctuations than for longer-term ones (they account for
only 3 percent of the hypothetical variance for levels, but for 37 percent
for rates of change).
The higher standard error from the annual data than from the phase
data reflects partly simply the longer interval to which the phase standard
error refers—four years on the average for the United States, five and
one-half for the United Kingdom. However, if this were the only effect,
the standard error for the annual data would be between /4 and /5.5
times the standard error for the United Kingdom, or at most .0218 on the
final line (.0093 /5.5). It is higher than that presumably because our
phase data eliminate a systematic cyclical effect in addition to averaging
out serially independent errors.